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Abstract 
Failure has become an increasingly important theme of debate in the literature on neoliberal 
natures. In this article we take up this topic with respect to ecological offsetting, often regarded 
as an exemplar of market-orientated conservation. Comparing the case of species banking which 
emerged in California in the 1990s with frustrated efforts to implement a biodiversity offsetting 
programme in England beginning in 2010, we develop a novel analytical framework for 
explaining why this kind of environmental market-making may or may not be successful in 
different contexts. Drawing on work in geography on the neoliberalisation of nature and insights 
from economic sociology, we characterise ecological offsetting as command-and-commodify 
regulation: a peculiar form of hybrid ecological regulation which depends on an institutional mix 
of authoritative and economic power to function. In California, these kinds of environmental 
markets initially emerged at a moment of compromise, contingent on an embrace of market 
solutions to environmental problems on the one hand, and a somewhat paradoxical expansion 
of authoritative power to ecologically regulate land development, on the other. In England, by 
contrast, deep fiscal austerity and deregulatory zeal, combined with resistance from nearly every 
quarter, initially undermined the possibility of balancing economic and authoritative power, 
which we argue is necessary for the construction of viable ecological offsetting. Reflecting on 
themes in the wider literature, we conclude by questioning whether the English experience is 
indicative of sharpening tensions between economy and ecology in the late neoliberal era. 
Keywords: neoliberal natures, ecological offsetting, environmental markets, 
command-and-commodify regulation, England, California 
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Introduction 
Taking stock of the last decades work on neoliberal natures in the inaugural issue of this journal, 
Bigger and Dempsey (2018) reflect on developments out there in the neoliberal world since 
2008, how nature-society relations have been reshaped in the process, and the evolution of the 
field during that period. While themes identified in early reviews by Castree (2008a, 2008b) and 
Bakker (2010) remain central to this sprawling literature, Bigger and Dempsey (2018) observe 
increasing attention given to shifts from government to governance, financialisation, new 
environmental markets, and links between generalised austerity and intensified extractivism. Yet 
as they note, efforts to financialise nature and create new markets frequently run aground. In 
the realm of nature conservation, where this rhetoric is often at its strongest among proponents 
and critical scholars alike (e.g. Bayon and Jenkins, 2010; Büscher et al., 2012), the explosive wave 
of green capital and commodification has largely failed to materialise on any large scale 
(Dempsey and Suarez, 2016), and contemporary patterns of environmental destruction, 
injustice, and harm seem remarkably congruous with decades and centuries past (Lave 2018). 
Why has producing new forms of neoliberal nature proved so troublesome? What conditions are 
necessary for new markets in nature to emerge? In this article, we connect these questions to 
the politics of austerity and environmental protection in the neoliberal era, asking how and why 
environmental market-making has taken hold when and where it has, and what the future may 
hold for such efforts.  
To address these questions, we examine two empirical cases of building markets in ecological 
offsets: the successful establishment of species banking in California in the 1990s; and the 
initially abandoned development of biodiversity offsetting in England in the early 2010s, followed 
by the more recent revival of these efforts under the guise of biodiversity net gain. Offsetting 
is an ensemble of tradable permit mechanisms often held up as an archetypal example of 
market-based conservation (Bull et al., 2013; ten Kate et al., 2004). It allows land developers to 
meet regulatory obligations relating to ecological impact by compensating for harm they cause 
onsite through payment for ecologically equivalent improvements elsewhere. Our comparison 
of the successful development of a market in offsets in California with the (as yet) unsuccessful 
and still unfolding English example is especially relevant to ongoing debates within the literature. 
As both Asiyanbi (2018) and Lave (2018) note, failure is a big part of the neoliberal natures story. 
Yet despite Castrees (2008a) early appeal, comparative studies remain something of a rarity.  
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Our study helps fill this gap, asking why such similar forms of environmental market-making 
flourished in one time and place, but faltered in the other. What material conditions and 
contingent factors were present in California but absent in England in an era of supposed market 
supremacy in environmental policymaking? And what are the implications of these differences 
for our understanding of neoliberal natures? To answer, we develop an explanatory approach 
that categorises ecological offsetting as a form of command-and-commodify regulation (see 
also Rea, 2017), emphasising how expansion of authoritative state power is vital to the forms of 
reregulation necessary to constitute environmental markets. Offsetting programmes are of 
course commonly understood as regulatory markets, and an extensive literature has revealed 
the contingent and inherently hybrid characteristics of actually existing neoliberal natures, as 
geographically distinct articulations of market, state and local forces (e.g. Lockie and Higgins, 
2007; Lockwood and Davidson, 2010; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; McCarthy, 2005; McElwee, 
2012). Our synthetic approach aims to situate these insights  and especially studies of regulatory 
markets, like ecological offsetting and cap-and-trade  by giving both a meso-level explanation 
of how offsetting functions institutionally, and a macro-level understanding of the fragile political 
economic conditions and relations of power which underpin it. 
We argue this framework not only explains the difficulties encountered by the UK government, 
but that our findings are suggestive of the challenges of environmental market-making more 
generally. We make the case that the policymaking process in England fell apart under the 
sharpening tensions of late neoliberalism  and that, to the extent English policymakers have 
recently tried to rescue offsetting, they have had to embrace more authoritative and less 
liberalising policy measures. In short, a politically blinkered faith in market efficiencies under an 
extreme programme of austerity and growth-orientated deregulation has had to give way to 
(proposed) expansions of authoritative state control over environmental protection
expansions that we argue are central to constituting command-and-commodify regulation. 
Instead of establishing a market-mediated compromise between competing economic and 
environmental demands (e.g. Carton, 2014; Felli, 2015), the initial attempted market-making 
exercise in England became irretrievably politicised and was undermined by the very politics of 
liberalisation that seemed to underpin the project in the first place. As new offsetting 
programmes continue to stutter in other contexts, we ask if the English experience may be more 
symptomatic of the challenges of striking the political compromises that undergird command-
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and-commodify regulation. The English case, we argue, may highlight the limits of neoliberal 
natures in contexts of extreme austerity, deregulation, and liberalisation.  
Our argument proceeds in five sections. We begin with an overview of the concepts and the 
historical development of ecological offsetting, understood as an example of natures 
neoliberalisation. We then turn from a historical to theoretical discussion, where we give a more 
detailed account of command-and-commodify regulation, situated in debates about neoliberal 
natures. After laying out our analytical framework, we present the two empirical cases, first using 
our approach to show how and why species banking emerged and became institutionalised in 
California in the 1990s, and then to explain how and why biodiversity offsetting faltered in 
England in the early 2010s only to remerge in recalibrated form more recently. We conclude by 
discussing the implications of our findings for the future of ecological offsetting and 
environmental markets more generally, and how they might contribute to ongoing debates 
about the futures of neoliberal natures. 
Ecological offsetting 
Ecological offsetting1 encompasses a variety of regulatory and voluntary programmes around 
the world, but a commonly accepted definition given by the Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme describes them as measurable conservation outcomes resulting from action 
designed to compensate for significant residual adverse biodiversity impacts arising from project 
development after appropriate prevention and mitigation measures have taken place (BBOP, 
2013: 4). A number of features are usually identified. First, offsets aim for no net loss of 
ecological value, where loss and gain are measured quantitatively against a pre-development 
baseline using a consistent metric. Second, under the polluter pays principle, offsets require 
developers to finance compensation actions, which are preferably delivered by third party offset 
providers. Third, offsite compensation must be a last resort after onsite damage has been 
minimised in line with the mitigation hierarchy. Fourth, compensation actions must be 
additional, meaning offset credits purchased to neutralise environmental loss cannot be 
                                                          
1  We use ecological offsetting rather than the more common term biodiversity offsetting to avoid 
confusion between this general formulation and biodiversity offsetting in England  the second of our 
empirical cases. 
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generated from conservation activities which would have happened without developer payment 
(BBOP, 2013; Bull et al., 2013). 
Ecological offsetting is often held up as a paradigmatic case of the neoliberalisation of nature 
and market-orientated forms of environmental protection (e.g. Apostolopoulou and Adams, 
2017; Büscher et al., 2012; Spash, 2015). Like many similar kinds of policymaking, ecological 
offsetting promises economic benefits to businesses by streamlining regulatory compliance, 
allowing development and growth to proceed with greater speed and certainty (Carroll et al., 
2009; BBOP, 2013). Offsetting is also presented as a significant business opportunity in its own 
right, which should stimulate green enterprise and growth to meet market demand (Madsen et 
al., 2011). Standardisation and quantification are supposed to generate more transparent and 
accurate procedures for auditing regulatory compliance (Carroll et al., 2009; Gardner et al., 
2013). Explicit pricing of environmental damage is said to both internalise and make ecologys 
value economically visible to decision-makers, and to incentivise more rational land and resource 
use (eftec et al., 2010; OECD, 2013). By making developers pay, proponents argue offsetting 
directly levers much-needed private finance for conservation activity at a time when 
governments willingness and capacity to do so is increasingly under strain (Jenkins et al., 2004; 
Kiesecker et al., 2009). Finally, underpinning these multiple benefits is a central role for market 
forces in resolving traditional conflicts between economic and environmental goals: market 
competition between specialist offset providers is expected to drive more efficient permitting 
processes, while simultaneously delivering high quality and cost-effective compensation and 
conservation outcomes (Bayon, 2004; ten Kate and Inbar, 2008). At the rhetorical level at least, 
this win-win narrative has come to dominate much of the policy discourse surrounding ecological 
offsetting. Nevertheless, a proliferating literature on its many challenges, limitations and 
injustices reveals a far more complex and variegated story of actually existing offset policies 
and practices. 
U.S. origins 
In the United States, offsettings origins lie in efforts to mitigate for losses of wetland systems 
caused by land development. The practice of mitigating ecological impacts per se stretches at 
least as far back as the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (FWCA) of 1934, which required 
government agencies involved with dam construction to consult with the Bureau of Fisheries in 
order to help mitigate harm to fish migration routes (National Research Council, 2001: 61). Later 
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amendments in 1958 expanded the environmental scope of the FWCA (Lave, 2014: 66), but it 
was not until the consolidation of environmental laws in the 1970s  passed on the back of 
growing social pressure to address the environmental impacts of post-war growth  that 
mitigation became a requirement rather than simply a request of regulatory agencies. The 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (1972), retitled the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1977, 
institutionalised a regulatory permitting system that undergirds contemporary, market-oriented 
wetland mitigation banking. Specifically, Section 404 of the law obliges all land developers to 
acquire a permit for any actions involving the dredge and fill of the Waters of the United 
States. This provision enabled regulators in the US Army Corps of Engineers and newly founded 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to refuse development permits on environmental 
grounds, or to allow development to proceed provided specific conditions for minimising 
ecological harm are met (Gardner, 2011). Government regulators initially proved reluctant to 
wield this newly granted authority (Pittman and Waite, 2009). By the time of a 1977 amendments 
to the CWA, however, a series of lawsuits had forced the Corps to expand its regulatory role (Rea, 
2018; Mulligan, 2016). Moving into the 1980s, agreements to provide offsite compensation 
began to be institutionalised. Such provisions allowed developers to create new or to restore 
degraded wetlands elsewhere, rather than mitigate at the site of development itself 
(Environmental Law Institute, 1994; Hough and Robertson, 2009). This spatial and temporal 
separation of ecological impacts from ecological compensation paved the way for marketisation 
down the line, by enabling third parties to create ready-made wetland offsets that could be 
purchased by developers whenever needed (Robertson, 2004).  
The evolution of Section 404 enforcement, however, unfolded in a context of considerable 
political turbulence. By the 1980s, a severe environmental backlash was underway, spearheaded 
by a well-organised conservative business movement (Bonneuil, 2015; Layzer, 2012a). The CWA 
was one of a number of laws considered an intolerable constraint on free enterprise and growth 
by these resurgent forces (Hrabanski, 2015). At the same time, many environmental groups were 
equally concerned with the laws effectiveness, and growing evidence of implementation failures 
(Robertson, 2004). Eventually, during the administration of George H. W. Bush, enforcement of 
Section 404 was consolidated around the newly coined notion of no net loss of wetlands 
(Gardner, 2011). This approach offered a political (but not entirely ecological) compromise 
between environmental groups and the development lobby. It entailed extracting greater 
ecological concessions from developers in the form of offsite compensation, but also streamlined 
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the regulatory process, and involved environmental interests ceding ground  somewhat literally 
 to the ascendant pro-business agenda. Several phases of standardisation and regulatory 
refinement have since accompanied the consolidation of wetland banking as a large-scale 
commercial industry in the United States. Though ecological performance and compliance 
remains mixed, it is generally acknowledged wetland banking has significantly improved the 
quality and governance of compensatory mitigation as part of the CWA (Hough and Robertson, 
2009; Gardner, 2011).  
International context and practical problems 
The political and regulatory popularity of wetland mitigation banking in the United States played 
a critical role in spreading offsetting approaches around the world. In the early 2000s, 
transnational mining companies, in collaboration with major conservation organisations, were 
at the forefront of creating standards for offsetting in other contexts, precipitating the 
establishment of the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP) in 2004 (Benabou, 
2014). Its appeal and legitimacy were heavily mediated by growing international emphasis on 
market-based instruments (MBIs) in environmental policymaking, and the shift towards an 
ecosystem services model in nature conservation (see MEA, 2005; TEEB, 2010). This put 
techniques of economic valuation and MBIs at the heart of efforts to meet global targets to curb 
biodiversity loss, and a putative reconciliation of economic and environmental goals (Gómez-
Baggethun and Muradian, 2015). 
Despite increasing prevalence around the world, however, ecological offsetting remains beset 
by an array of challenges both in theory and in practice, which are fiercely contested from 
different perspectives in an ever-expanding literature (see e.g. Apostolopoulou and Adams, 
2017; Dempsey and Collard, 2017; Hase and ten Kate, 2017). First, long-running conceptual and 
technical controversies persist over the adequacy and precision of the underlying ecological 
science, appropriate forms of measurement and accounting, and biophysical limitations of 
ecological restoration itself (Bull et al., 2013; Calvet et al., 2015; Maron et al., 2016; Moreno-
Mateos et al., 2015). Second, addressing persistent problems associated with regulatory 
compliance, monitoring and enforcement is a recurrent theme of debates (Clare and Krogman, 
2013; Gordon et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2009). Third, critical scholars have drawn attention to 
the ways offsetting serves the needs of accumulation over nature conservation and social 
concerns. They point to a series of tensions and contradictions that undermine its ecological 
 7 
efficacy in practice, contending that offsetting is a false solution to ecological crisis which also 
entrenches existing inequalities and injustices (Robertson, 2006; Seagle, 2012; Spash, 2015; 
Sullivan, 2013). 
Command-and-commodify: conditions for environmental market-making 
With these debates in mind, we turn to developing an analytical framework designed to 
understand and compare the emergence  or not  of ecological offsetting in different contexts. 
This framework, which defines offsetting programmes as command-and-commodify regulatory 
markets, synthesises insights from literature on neoliberal natures and economic sociology. The 
former helps clarify the political economic conditions and drivers through which ecological 
offsetting emerged and gained popularity. The latter pinpoints the institutional arrangements 
and exercise of power necessary for these kinds of environmental markets to develop and 
function in practice. For these conditions to cohere in particular contexts, we argue offsetting 
requires stabilisation of certain state-capital relations of power with respect to land 
development and nature conservation, alongside articulation of specific deregulatory and re-
regulatory processes. The combined theoretical framework allows us to compare and contrast 
California and England at the macro and meso levels, and to ask what facilitated this form of 
environmental market-making in California in the 1990s, but what has inhibited it so far in 
England in the 2010s. 
Neoliberal natures 
Literature on the neoliberalisation of nature helps to situate ecological offsetting within 
historical and political economic trends whereby selling nature to save it (McAfee, 1999) 
became common sense in environmental policymaking. In his seminal piece, Castree (2008a) 
distinguishes four crucial dynamics of such processes: (1) privatisation and marketisation of 
aspects of the social, cultural or biophysical world previously outside those relations; (2) 
deregulation of existing command-and-control regimes of governance combined with market-
enabling reregulation; (3) increased use of market-like organisational practices in the public 
sector; and (4) the devolution of regulatory and administrative responsibility to non-state actors. 
Scholars studying the distinct subfield of neoliberal conservation have documented the 
increasing pervasiveness of market rationality and techniques of economic valuation used in 
nature conservation, and wider subordination of other environmental protection regimes to 
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accumulation and elite interests (Büscher et al., 2014). Ecological offsetting is frequently held up 
by proponents and critics alike as a prime example of these types of marketising and liberalising 
trends. Indeed, the compromise between the development lobby and environmentalists, which 
helped constitute wetland banking, can be understood as one element of what Harvey (2005) 
calls the reconstitution of class power. For Harvey, this defines the neoliberal project, aiming 
towards the long-term defeat or co-optation of the forces arrayed against capital. In California 
and the United States more broadly, the embrace of wetland mitigation banking signalled a 
partial submission to deregulatory forces, while lending legitimacy to the market logic 
underpinning offsetting. 
Deregulation, however, was never absolute. A reregulatory logic was at play too, driven by 
growing acknowledgement of environmental limits, and ecological and political threats posed to 
accumulation (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004). As Felli (2015) has argued, the increasing appeal 
of MBIs rested on the promise of addressing environmental limits, albeit in ways that would 
simultaneously dissipate oppositional environmental politics. Ecological offsetting fits this bill. 
Even as the co-optive and market-like institutional features of ecological offsetting became well-
established in the United States and beyond, it also depended upon relatively clear-cut 
extensions of state-directed ecological regulation and enforcement, most visibly in the form of 
legal mandates for ecological compensation. 
This distinctive mix of market liberalisation and expanding state control has fostered analytical 
ambiguity in studies of ecological offsetting and similar MBIs. Many studies have, for instance, 
questioned the market status attributed to the wide and heterogeneous range of real-world 
offset systems, pointing to their partial reliance on command-and-control mechanisms and 
highlighting other deviations from real markets (Vaissière and Levrel, 2015; Boisvert et al., 
2013). This distinctive mix of market liberalisation and expanding state control has fostered 
analytical ambiguity in studies of ecological offsetting and similar MBIs. Many studies have, for 
instance, questioned the market status attributed to the wide and heterogeneous range of real-
world offset systems, pointing to their partial reliance on command-and-control mechanisms 
and highlighting other deviations from real markets (Vaissière and Levrel, 2015; Boisvert et al., 
2013). This institutional complexity, however, is consistent with the wider literature on 
neoliberal natures, which theorises neoliberalisation as always contradictory, incomplete, 
geographically-specific and hybrid in character (Dressler and Roth, 2011; Lockwood and 
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Davidson, 2010; Lockie and Higgins, 2007; see also Brenner et al., 2010). Actually existing 
neoliberalism has always departed somewhat from the airy rhetoric around it, refracted through 
social, biophysical and contextual contingencies and resistances (Bakker, 2010; Dempsey and 
Robertson, 2012; Holmes and Cavanagh, 2016; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; McElwee, 2012). 
Bringing in economic sociology: power and institutions 
Insights from economic sociology are useful for sorting out the seemingly contradictory and 
muddled institutional features of ecological offsetting and other regulatory markets. First, we 
argue these kinds of regulatory market crystalise a distinctive configuration of authoritative and 
economic social power, which we call command-and-commodify regulation. This label 
distinguishes ecological offsets (and comparable institutions, like cap-and-trade schemes) as 
hybrid instruments which are not straightforwardly market-based, even as they channel certain 
neoliberal logics and are borne out of neoliberal conditions. Second and more importantly, 
through these conceptual distinctions we show how these forms of regulation work on a practical 
level. Literature on neoliberal natures has long recognised that marketising trends require 
processes of reregulation. Our command-and-commodify framework adds analytical specificity 
to these insights. In particular, identifying the specific ways that new markets in nature are built 
of concomitant expansions of authoritative and economic dimensions of regulatory power helps 
make clear the institutional articulations and political economic compromises that allow for the 
development of reforms like ecological offsetting. 
Authoritative and economic power 
Max Weber (1978: 943-8) originally articulated the distinction between what he called 
diametrically contrasting authoritative and economic forms of domination. Authoritative 
power, Weber (1978: 948) explained, is direct, unilateral social control of a princely sort, 
wherein actors are subject to direct mandates and have to comply with the given command. In 
environmental policy, institutions characterized largely by authoritative power have become 
commonly (and pejoratively) referred to as command-and-control forms of regulation (Cox, 
2016; Ioris, 2014), which neoliberal and market-oriented reforms supposedly work against. 
Typically, regulatory agencies authoritatively command firms and other actors to adopt specific 
production practices or best available technologies. Compliance in practice may depend on 
levels of regulatory oversight and the cost of sanctions, but the basic character of social power 
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remains direct and authoritative: specific standards and requirements are set by the state and in 
principle, must be followed. 
Economic power, or what some economic sociologists call structural power (Roy, 1997; Dobbin 
and Dowd, 2000) or power based on dependence (Granovetter, 2017), works differently. 
Instead of direct, authoritative commands, the state or other actors (e.g. social movement 
organisations) wield economic power by reconfiguring incentive structures and morally encoded 
meanings of exchange in markets (Fourcade and Healy, 2007) such that it makes more sense 
for market participants to take one course of action over another. Many neoliberal policy reforms 
and MBIs rely on economic power of this sort. Emissions taxes and voluntary product labelling 
schemes (e.g. fair trade coffee; sustainable forestry) do not mandate that market participants 
change their behaviour. Instead, these forms of regulation shift the moral terrain and 
profitability of market exchanges, such that selling fair trade coffee is not only more profitable, 
but profitable because it is virtuous  or, conversely, emitting less pollution is not only virtuous, 
but profitable, since (under a cap-and-trade scheme) surplus emissions credits can be sold to 
other polluters. These shifts in meanings and profitability of market exchanges create what 
Weber termed a constellation of interests that incentivises some behaviours over others. 
Market logic and profitability, rather than hierarchical authority, undergirds economic power  
in a similar vein to Foucaults distinction between neoliberal governmentality and sovereign 
forms of power (e.g. Fletcher, 2010). However, distinctions between economic and authoritative 
dimensions of social power are analytical, not strictly substantive. Authoritative and economic 
means of controlling behaviour are often entwined or fluid (Weber, 1978: 943). States, after 
all, use authoritative power to enforce property rights regimes that structure economic action 
and make markets possible in the first place (Campbell and Lindberg, 1990; Fligstein, 2001). As 
Polanyi (2001: 146) made clear, even the freest of markets are built and maintained by 
continuous, centrally organized and controlled interventionism.  
Forms of neoliberal governance and institutional requisites for their emergence 
Still, conceptualising economic power as orthogonal to authoritative power enables the two 
analytical moves noted above. First, it allows for separation of ecological offsetting and similar 
examples from other instruments of neoliberal environmental governance dependent on a 
different configuration of economic and authoritative sources of power. Many neoliberal policy 
reforms, like product labelling schemes (Bartley, 2007; Guthman, 2007) or private forms of 
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conservation, such as land trusts (Kay, 2016), are voluntary. They rely on economic but not on 
authoritative forms of power to shape human relationships with nature. Ecological offsetting, 
like cap-and-trade, is different. On the one hand, economic power is crucial. By putting a price 
on ecological impact, offsetting imposes costs on land developers and creates opportunities for 
generating revenue for offset providers. Economic power and market exchange thus clearly 
shape how and where harm to nature plays out, and attempts to neutralise it. On the other hand, 
offsetting policies also heavily depend upon authoritative mandates for land developers to 
offset. These requirements create the demand necessary for offset markets to function. In 
comparison to prevailing regimes where such regulatory compulsion was unusual or uneven, 
offsetting therefore implies an extension of state control over ecological regulation of land 
development. This combination of expanded economic and authoritative control is the 
institutional signature of command-and-commodify regulation, summarised in Table 1. 
 
Regulatory 
Form 
Authoritative 
Power 
Economic 
Power 
Examples Sample Studies 
Command-
and-control 
High Low Best available 
technology mandates; 
industry specific 
emissions requirements;  
Sinclair, 1997; Hubner, 
2009; loris 2014; Cox 
2016 
Private or 
voluntary 
Low High Product labelling 
schemes; voluntary 
production standards; 
corporate social 
responsibility 
Vogel, 2005; 
Guthman, 2007; 
Bartley, 2007; Farley 
and Costanza, 2010; 
Locke, 2013; Kay, 
2016, 2018 
Command-
and-
commodify 
High High Wetland mitigation 
banking; species 
conservation banking; 
Robertson, 2004; Lave, 
2012; Lederer, 2012; 
Lockhart, 2015; 
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biodiversity offsetting; 
cap-and-trade 
Vaissière and Levrel, 
2015; Rea, 2017 
 Table 1: Three forms of regulation and their characteristic configurations of power 
 
Beyond simply classifying different regulatory approaches, focusing on how command-and-
commodify regulation institutionally articulates economic and authoritative dimensions of social 
power reveals quite specific political economic circumstances and social relations required for 
these environmental markets to emerge. In drawing out the ways offsetting relies upon 
authoritative power, it becomes apparent that these forms of regulation can only develop where 
regulators are able and willing to extend the scope of regulatory intervention in ways which 
consistently and uniformly mandate compensatory action for ecological harm. By examining 
offsettings dependence upon economic power at the same time, it becomes clear that actors 
must also be able to successfully commodify and circulate units of nature as fungible offset 
credits, to lubricate compliance processes rather than allowing environmental laws to impede 
land development.    
Towards a theoretical synthesis 
Referencing broader insights of the neoliberal natures literature, we argue this two-dimensional 
shift of authoritative and economic power rests on the maintenance of a very particular balance 
of power, where developers  individually and as a political force  will concede to policymakers 
and environmental regulators that compromise and acquiescence is beneficial to their material 
interests, at least more so than active noncompliance. Equally, environmental regulators and 
movement groups must cede to land developers a level of ecological loss, provided some level 
of ecological protection and restoration is provided as compensation. Since offsetting has 
developed in an era of capital ascendency and increasing political turbulence, creating and 
maintaining conditions for this economic-ecological compromise is far from straightforward. 
Subtle shifts away from market liberalisation and towards stronger authoritative state control, 
on one hand, or towards harder pro-market, anti-regulation politics and away from state 
intervention, on the other, could each thwart the development of ecological offsetting and other 
comparable forms of regulatory markets (Figure 1). The key insight is this: command-and-
commodify institutions are not just the products of capital ascendency under late neoliberalism. 
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They are instead relatively delicate institutional compromises forged where loosely statist and 
pro-environment forces can expand their authoritative reach at the same time as new markets 
and circuits of exchange are created which generate economic forms of power.   
To illustrate these dynamics, we turn to an empirical discussion of the patterns of reregulation 
that led to the emergence of ecological offsetting in California in the early 1990s, allowing for 
the development of command-and-commodify regulation in the form of species banking 
(Carreras Gamarra and Toombs, 2017; Pawliczek and Sullivan, 2011; Rea, 2017). As we 
subsequently show, the same institutional articulation of forces which made this possible in 
California proved to be more volatile in the early 2010s in England (Lockhart, 2015, 2016; Sullivan 
and Hannis, 2015; Taherzadeh and Howley, 2017), when and where politics and ideology were 
dissonant with patterns of reregulation required for command-and-commodify regulation to 
emerge. 
 
Figure 1: The balance of authoritative and economic power for command-and-commodify 
regulation to emerge. 
Successful market-making in California 
The first commercial, for-profit species conservation banks in the United States were officially 
approved in late 1994 and early 1995. These market-oriented regulatory innovations drew legal 
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authority from the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA), built on the institutional template 
provided by wetland mitigation banking and compensatory mitigation (permitted under the 
CWA) 2 . Like ecological offsetting and wetland mitigation banking more concretely, species 
banking aims to create or restore sizable pieces of endangered species habitat (usually hundreds 
of acres) that can be divided up into smaller credits, offered for sale to offset unavoidable 
harm to species habitat caused by development projects. Most development projects impacts 
to endangered species habitat are relatively small. Fractions of an acre are typical. Consolidating 
offsets for such harm into larger banks of land, the argument goes, helps minimise the creeping 
threat of extinction by a thousand cuts, wherein many individually insignificant reductions in 
habitat  and fragmented, piecemeal bits of habitat set aside to offset those impacts  
collectively threaten the survival and recovery of a protected species.  
The market-like features of species conservation banking are most visible in the production and 
exchange of species credits themselves, which bank owners, including public agencies, sell to 
generate revenue or profit. Prices for such species credits are not regulated. In most cases the 
central determinant of price is the real estate market and habitat restoration costs in the 
surrounding area. Where adjacent to prime development land in coastal California, for instance, 
vernal pool fairy shrimp credits can exceed a half-million dollars per acre. In rural Alabama, 
gopher tortoise credits garner only a few thousand dollars each. Panther habitat units (in 
Florida), salmon spawning ground credits (in Washington State), San Joaquin kit fox credits (in 
California), and golden-cheeked warbler credits (in Texas) are among the many examples of 
commodified ecologies currently for sale in the thriving market for endangered species offset 
credits in the United States. 
Exploiting California exceptionalism 
When the first species conservation banks were established in the early 1990s, however, they 
were confined to the environmentally progressive state of California. It took until 2002  nearly 
a decade  before a single species bank appeared in any other U.S. state (Texas and then Arizona) 
 despite almost all species conservation banks in California having been authorised under the 
                                                          
2 The first commercial, for-profit wetland mitigation bank was approved by the Corps in 1990 in Louisiana; 
the second was approved in 1992 in Georgia. See the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Regulatory In-Lieu Fee 
and Bank Information Tracking System (RIBITS) database, available at https://ribits.usace.army.mil/. See 
also (Robertson, 2004; Gardner, 2011; Lave, 2012) 
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auspices of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the federal agency charged with enforcing 
the ESA across the entire United States. What was happening in California such that a new and 
market-oriented form of nature protection took hold there in the 1990s, but not elsewhere in 
the United States?  
In ecological terms, California is home to one of the worlds few biodiversity hotspots (Myers 
et al., 2000) and has the highest number of officially listed threatened and endangered animal 
species of any U.S. state. It is also the most populous state in the country and the site of extensive 
urban and suburban sprawl that might spur demand for endangered species offset credits. Yet a 
number of other states, notably Florida, Georgia, Tennessee, and Alabama, share similar overlaps 
of land development and endangered species ranges  and Florida at substantially and 
consistently higher levels than California (Rea, 2017: pp. 28-9). The question of why there and 
then, in other words, is not simply a matter of ecology, but of political economy. 
A shift towards the market and economic power 
The emergence of species banking in California, we contend, must be situated in an increasing 
reliance on economic power  dynamics of markets and exchange  to regulate societys relation 
to nature, and the related pro-business, anti-environment backlash that had been unfolding 
since the 1970s. Globally, the late 1980s and 1990s were characterised by uneven but sweeping 
embraces of deregulation, liberalisation, and policy marketisation across policy domains 
(Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002; Harvey, 2005; Prasad, 2006; Mann, 2013). These shifts in 
governance were enmeshed in environmental policy (Liverman, 2004; McCarthy and Prudham, 
2004), made manifest in developments like market-oriented approaches to limiting ozone 
depleting chemicals (Gareau, 2013), the ecosystem services paradigm (Daily, 1997; de Groot et 
al., 2002), and private and voluntary environmental regulation, like fair-trade and sustainable 
forestry labeling schemes (Bartley, 2007; Guthman, 2007). At the national level, these 
marketising trends were apparent in, for example, George H.W. Bushs embrace of the no net 
loss approach to wetlands in 1988 and his and the subsequent Clinton administrations support 
for the then-novel idea of cap-and-trade programs to reduce sulfur dioxide and carbon emissions 
(Cook, 1988; Solomon and Gorman, 2002; Layzer, 2012b). 
Within California, the centre-right administration of governor Pete Wilson, in office from 1991 
to 1999, was aligned with these marketising trends. The governor and his allies were eager to 
streamline environmental protections to appease developers and stimulate economic growth 
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following the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s. Feldman and Jonas (2000) analyse land 
development politics in California that flowed from these political commitments. We reiterate 
that the logic of offsetting provided an appealing path forward within the historically specific 
intersection of pro-growth and pro-environment politics characteristic of the place and time. In 
this context, state-level bureaucrats in California drafted the first-of-its-kind regulatory guidance 
on species conservation banking in 1995, and federal-level FWS regulators based in California 
began to include offsetting requirements in land development permits. As one high-level 
bureaucrat put it:  
the developers  validated what we were proposing [species conservation 
banking], and that carried a lot of weight with the governor whod been elected 
with their support and who understood, I think appropriately, that one of the 
things he had to do was to break the log jam [i.e. the conflict between pro-growth 
and pro-environment factions]. 
By offering offsets, environmental regulators in California helped to create Webers 
constellation of interests that made it make sense for land developers comply with 
environmental protection law. Offsetting, they surmised, was more cost effective and efficient 
than the risk of having to relocate a planned land development project, providing ones own 
ecological compensation, or stopping a planned project altogether. 
A perfect storm for expanding authoritative power 
These institutional changes still required substantial concessions from developers  namely, their 
willingness to bear the costs of endangered species offsets. Such requirements were relatively 
new in endangered species protection. In Californias recent past (i.e. the 1980s and earlier) and 
in the 1990s and 2000s across the rest of the United States, the administrative consensus was 
that compensatory mitigation could not be made a requirement in the most common 
applications of the ESA3. So why did land developers in California acquiesce to costly expansions 
of authoritative regulatory power, when nationally dominant interpretations of the ESA 
suggested federal regulators in California were overstepping their authority? 
                                                          
3 Specifically, policy guidance issued by the FWS forbids the use of compensatory mitigation under Section 
7 of the Endangered Species Act  the most commonly invoked section of the law in the context of land 
development projects.  
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The answer is twofold and particular to the political economic features of California at that 
historical moment. First, a thicket of state-level environmental legislation in California provided 
regulatory cover for federal bureaucrats in the FWS  not directly accountable to state-level laws 
 to expand their authority. In southern California, the first implementation of the Natural 
Community Conservation Planning Act of 1991 paved the way for inclusion of offsets in large-
scale development plans at the level of state law (Feldman and Jonas, 2000). The stringent 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) also supported such provisions. FWS regulators 
working in California may have lacked formal authority to make parallel demands under the 
national-level ESA, but as multiple informants put it, they nonetheless piggybacked on the 
authority of their state-level colleagues. Land developers, facing multiple levels of regulation 
(federal, state, local) found compliance easier than fighting these demands on different fronts.  
An expansion of legal activism by environmental advocacy groups provides the second reason 
environmental regulators in California could make new demands on developers. In the 1990s, 
environmental groups in California began to regularly sue the federal government for not 
robustly enforcing provisions of the ESA. Such activism was less common in other states, but in 
California, faced with this legal pressure, developers and regulators alike increasingly saw offsets 
as a means of demonstrating to advocacy groups and to courts their commitment to meeting or 
exceeding basic legal requirements for nature protection. By including formally voluntary 
conservation measures in their construction plans  as apart from mandatory mitigation 
measures not formally allowed in many ESA applications  developers and regulators alike could 
claim robust compliance with the law4. Coupled with supportive state-level environmental laws, 
these lawsuits helped federal environmental regulators extend their authoritative power to 
mandate offsets in California. The lawsuits also made it more cost-effective for developers to 
buy offsets than refuse compliance and risk a lawsuit that could slow down development. This 
coupled expansion of economic and authoritative forms of regulatory power, and the political 
economic compromises enabling their institutionalisation, facilitated establishment of a new 
command-and-commodify form of environmental regulation in California in the 1990s. 
                                                          
4 The traces of this creative legal-administrative maneuvering are in fact embedded in the confusing 
terminology of offsetting in the United States. The name species conservation banking refers to the 
formally voluntary conservation measures that U.S. Fish and Wildlife regulators recommended to land 
developers as a means of complying with the Endangered Species Act. Wetland mitigation banking, by 
contrast, refers to unambiguously mandatory mitigation measures that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
regulators routinely require under the Clean Water Act.  
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Failed market-making in England 
Two decades later, development of a biodiversity offsetting programme in England unfolded 
quite differently. The proposed use of a formal offsetting system, to quantify the value of habitat 
with the explicit goal of achieving of no net loss, first appeared in late 2011, little over a year 
after a new Conservative-led coalition came to power5. While these moves were acrimoniously 
aborted in 2014 and appeared dead, they gradually re-emerged under the guise of biodiversity 
net gain in 2018. At the time of writing (April 2019), this recalibrated set of proposals is expected 
to be put before the UK parliament as part of a new wide-ranging Environment Bill, to be passed 
into legislation. Back in 2011, piloting offsetting in six local areas was a centrepiece of a new 
Natural Environment White Paper, a 50-year national strategy promising a reconfiguration of 
nature conservation policy around the green economy (Defra, 2011). At the core of the White 
Paper was the notion that, in line with Defras emerging natural capital agenda (Lawton and 
Rudd, 2013; UK NEA, 2011), economic and environmental goals were not intrinsically opposed. 
Meeting international and domestic targets to halt biodiversity loss could be met, it claimed, by 
mobilising novel techniques of economic valuation and MBIs to deliver win-win outcomes 
through green growth. As in California, this embrace of market-orientated nature conservation 
emerged at a specific historical juncture, during the turbulence following the 2008 global 
financial crisis and ensuing domestic recession. The Conservatives election platform had rested 
on a programme of deep austerity and deregulation to restore economic stability and growth 
(Cameron, 2010; Gamble, 2015). 
Under the new government, the planning system and environmental legislation came under 
particular attack (Cowell, 2013; Kaminski, 2015; Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2014). Both had long 
been characterised as bureaucratic fetters on growth by development lobbyists, conservative 
think tanks and the national press (Haughton and Allmendinger, 2013, 2016). The Conservatives 
seized on this narrative to explain slow growth and spiralling problems of unaffordable housing, 
especially in London and the southeast. When the governments fiscal austerity threatened to 
choke the fragile economic recovery, government leaders redirected blame at stringent 
environmental legislation for blocking or delaying vital housing and infrastructure development 
(e.g. Carrington, 2013; Harvey, 2011; Watt, 2012). Under Defras Secretary of State Owen 
                                                          
5 Mitigation, including offsite compensation, for ecological impact was already stipulated under existing 
planning policy, but was only used on an ad hoc basis and rarely enforced, without standard rules or forms 
of measurement (David Tyldesley and Associates, 2012).    
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Paterson  an environmental sceptic and opponent of business regulation (Carrington, 2012)  
offsetting was positioned as a discrete mechanism within a raft of planning reforms to accelerate 
land development (e.g. Paterson, 2013). Its orientation was shaped heavily by strict deregulatory 
criteria, based on the principle that command-and-control authoritative power was suffocating 
economic dynamism. Under the Red Tape Challenge, against which all new government policy 
was tested, additional burden on business was prohibited, unless two  and later three  pieces 
of regulation were removed in compensation (BIS, 2013). 
Win-win narratives 
Offsets, it was hoped, would lubricate the moment of development control, where planning 
consent required demonstration of suitable mitigation measures to address significant damage 
to biodiversity (Defra, 2013; see also Aldersgate Group, 2013; EMTF, 2013; Environment Bank, 
2013; Newey, 2012). In short, a market-based offsetting regime would provide an economically 
advantageous way for developers to meet their regulatory requirements. However, since it 
remained uncertain if this claim could be realised, the experimental policy framework trialled 
locally remained strictly voluntary. While compliance with biodiversity duties was necessary, it 
would be entirely up to developers whether to use the new offsetting framework to meet the 
requirements (ENDS Report, 2011). 
While this non-negotiable deregulatory logic dominated, it was not the whole story. The ability 
for the government to simply remove environmental protections was limited by European law, 
most importantly the EU Habitats and Wild Birds Directives. The prevailing mitigation regime, 
meanwhile, was performing particularly poorly at tackling loss of habitats at lower level 
designation, contributing to the UK governments failure to meet legally binding EU targets to 
halt biodiversity loss by 2020 (Lawton et al., 2010). State regulation was proving ineffectual, with 
planning authorities either unwilling or unable to exercise authoritative power over developers. 
As part of the natural capital agenda, offsetting was put forward as a mechanism to consolidate 
and standardise regulation of land development, while simultaneously enrolling NGOs, 
landowners, consultant ecologists and developers more effectively into the process of delivery. 
Contingent upon the success of the trial program, Defra would introduce a nationwide system of 
voluntary offsetting that, it argued, would meet both development and conservation goals 
simultaneously without additional costs on business or government.  
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The rise and fall of biodiversity offsetting in England 
Trialling of the governments proposals in England began in April 2012 and ran for two years, led 
by ecology officers within local planning authorities (LPAs). The pilots aimed to encourage use of 
offsets for planning applications where biodiversity was a material consideration according to 
policy; to identify potential offset sites and providers; and to ensure regulatory compliance and 
long-term delivery (Defra, 2012a). The government published a habitat-based metric for 
measuring biodiversity, together with guidance on how offsetting should be applied (Defra, 
2012b). In late 2013, the policymaking process was accelerated when Paterson was appointed 
as Secretary of State at Defra, with what staff called a strong growth mandate (interview with 
Defra official). A Biodiversity Offsetting Green Paper was rapidly published for public 
consultation in September 2013, and nationwide rollout was set for early 2014 (Defra, 2013).  
Yet this ultimately proved to be the high-point of the proposals. Over the next six months, 
ongoing disagreements around the policys core objectives between government and 
stakeholder groups became highly polarised (Mathiesen, 2013; Vidal, 2014). This shattered a 
fragile consensus built on the promise of market-generated benefits for all. By mid-2014  at 
which time economic growth had returned  the proposals were abandoned. Major stakeholders 
had effectively withdrawn from the process, while the pilots fizzled out in failure (CEP and IEEP, 
2014a, 2014b). Ultimately, the Treasury department blocked the policys further development, 
on the grounds that Defra officials were unable to unequivocally demonstrate a cost-saving 
potential for developers. Paterson was unceremoniously sacked by the Prime Minister (Sparrow, 
2014), and offsetting was quietly dropped. As another General Election approached, the policy 
was deemed too controversial and complex to pursue in its existing form. 
A multiplicity of tensions and disputes contributed to the abandonment of offsetting in 2014. 
These reflected challenges commonly identified in the policy and academic literature, from 
questions of biodiversitys fungibility and appropriate forms of measurement, to those 
surrounding institutional arrangements, responsibilities and rules (Defra, 2016; EAC, 2013; 
Sullivan and Hannis, 2015; Taherzadeh and Howley, 2017). These debates became extremely 
fractious and politicised, and played a significant role in the governments decision to abandon 
nationwide implementation.  
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A failure to command commodification 
Yet what was striking about this case as a policymaking failure was not the controversies over 
detailed implementation plans, but the difficulties of assembling a functioning regulatory market 
at all. The command-and-commodify framework helps illuminate the deeper structural, political-
economic constraints that made this market-making process so difficult. Specifically, the 
government found that by failing to extend authoritative power over developers, it was 
impossible to constitute the economic power required to enrol the different actors needed to 
stimulate market participation. This failure took two related forms: (i) undermining the capacity 
of regulatory bodies through austerity planning reform; and (ii) insisting that offsetting would be 
voluntary for regulators and developers.  
It was well understood that chronic lack of capacity and expertise was seriously affecting LPAs 
ability to meet their statutory duties with respect to conservation before offsetting was put 
forward in 2011. Only around one third of LPAs employed a trained in-house ecologist (Newey, 
2012), and biodiversity had been found to be materially undervalued throughout the planning 
system, as a result of overriding economic imperatives and the considerable power and 
resources available to developers (Oxford, 2013). Compensation for biodiversity loss was 
imposed ad hoc in a vanishingly small number of cases, and rarely monitored or evaluated (CEP 
and IEEP, 2013; David Tyldesley and Associates, 2012). For many environmentalists, the initial 
appeal of offsetting was that a formalised system for explicitly quantifying biodiversity impact 
could partially address these issues. They also understood effective implementation of a complex 
policy instrument like offsetting would equally require significant investment in regulatory 
oversight and expertise (e.g. CIEEM, 2013; RSPB, 2013). Establishing the offsetting programme, 
in short, would necessitate clear and multivalent expansions of authoritative power in LPAs and 
other regulatory agencies. These were ultimately the preconditions set by many environmental 
groups if they were to participate in and lend legitimacy to the policy.  
Instead of extending institutional capacity to address problems of regulatory oversight, however, 
the governments programme of austerity undercut them further. Contemporaneous cuts to 
local government and regulatory agencies were extreme. The Association of Local Government 
Ecologists found that 10 of 13 areas of local biodiversity work underwent at least a 60% budget 
cut in 2011/12, expressing concern: 
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over the apparent mis-match between the aspirations and expectation 
expressed in the Natural Environment White Paper, when weighed against 
diminishing availability of resources within local government to actually engage 
with and undertake the sorts of biodiversity initiatives outlined (EFRA Committee, 
2012, p. 116). 
Moreover, the governments planning reforms  aimed at removing what was seen as state 
interference  reduced the scope for ecological regulation of land development. Pitched as a 
radical simplification exercise, the creation of the new National Policy Planning Framework 
(NPPF) not only removed hundreds of pages of planning guidance, it substantially reconfigured 
the relationship between growth and conservation duties in favour of the former (Cowell, 2013; 
DCLG, 2012; Tait and Inch, 2016). For instance, as part of wider reforms, responsibility for 
delivering five-year housing supply was passed to LPAs. If local strategies were judged to be 
inadequate in this regard, it could lead to LPAs powers of development control being overridden 
from above, under challenge from developers or central government (e.g. CPRE, 2015). This shift 
in focus was backed by a controversial presumption in favour of sustainable development 
clause institutionalised under the NPPF, while confidential and opaquely measured viability 
assessments allowed developers to dispute unreasonable planning conditions which might 
jeopardise individual projects (Colenutt et al., 2015). Regulators were also made subject to a 
growth duty under a new law aimed at facilitating infrastructure development (Kaminski, 2014, 
2015). Under the constrained conditions of austerity, LPAs were reluctant to extend their 
environmental reach  especially if they lacked in-house expertise  on such ambiguous ground, 
for fear of costly legal processes and other disciplinary measures used to enforce economic 
priorities over conservation ones. 
The second factor undermining offsetting was the insistence that any such programme must 
remain voluntary, both for regulators and developers. Any compulsory scheme, which could have 
resulted in additional regulatory burden on business, would have contravened government 
policy under the Red Tape Challenge. For government leaders, this was non-negotiable, and a 
position supported by the development lobby (e.g. HBF, 2013). Yet it went against the unanimous 
advice of the environmental NGOs, professional organisations representing ecologists, green 
business and policy consultants, who firmly held that offsetting was a regulatory market which 
had to be mandatory. A voluntary system, they argued  one we would identify as founded on 
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economic power alone  gave the impression to all stakeholders that compliance with no net 
loss was optional. In this scenario, developers had no incentive to use offsets unless it 
demonstrably saved them money or accelerated planning consent, stoking widespread fears that 
the proposals were nothing more than a license to trash (Mathiesen, 2013). Given that under 
the status quo mitigation and compensation were largely not happening, the proposed rules 
were extremely unlikely to lead to meaningful outcomes, since any extension of ecological 
regulation of land development would constitute additional cost. 
Without authoritative compulsion to use offsets, then, there would be no way of stimulating 
effective demand, nor sufficient supply from potential offset providers, since a voluntary system 
would give them no certainty of a sustainable income stream (e.g. CLA, 2013). This effectively 
stymied the possibility of constituting a functioning market: blunting expansions of authoritative 
regulatory power in turn undermined the exercise of economic power that could have structured 
land development decisions in a functioning market for nature. The final nail in the coffin 
occurred when the Treasury blocked the policy altogether, on the grounds that even the rollout 
of a voluntary mechanism would likely have placed unacceptable administrative costs on 
developers, by requiring them to understand the mechanics of a new planning instrument.  
The revival of offsetting as net gain? 
The sacking of Owen Paterson in mid-2014 appeared to be the death knell for a nationwide 
offsetting policy. Widely seen as an ill-considered failure, even key proponents noted offsetting 
had become toxic (Scott-Campbell, 2016). In the run-up and aftermath of the General Election 
of 2015, which returned Cameron as Prime Minister, offsetting no longer seemed part of the 
government agenda. However, in the turmoil that ensued from the unanticipated vote to leave 
the EU in June 2016, Cameron resigned and was replaced by Theresa May. May, who had 
campaigned to remain, was now tasked with negotiating the UKs exit from the EU, and 
extricating it from what the victorious Conservative right argued were overbearing and 
economically stifling European laws. In this context, the development lobby seemed well 
positioned to continue to push a strong deregulatory agenda (Kaminski, 2017; Parker, 2017), 
further narrowing the prospects of expanding authoritative power needed to constitute a 
functioning offsetting programme. Yet the post-referendum political landscape proved deeply 
unstable. Mays authority was severely weakened in June 2017, when she unexpectedly lost her 
governing majority in another General Election that she herself had called. Soon after, Michael 
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Gove, a high profile Conservative politician and leading leave campaigner who had stood 
against May for the leadership a year earlier, was appointed to as Secretary of State at Defra. As 
a result, the department suddenly found itself led by a cabinet minister with significant leverage 
over the Prime Minister in a fractured party, and one who was willing to prioritise Defras policy 
agenda, including by backing a new biodiversity net gain proposal. 
Though offsettings revival had seemed unlikely in the context of national politics, its 
development had persisted in local pockets. The single success story of the initial pilots, governed 
by the uniquely well-resourced Warwickshire County Council, provided an exemplar for local 
authorities trying to utilise existing policy instruments in planning (Environment Bank, 2016). 
Some large-scale developers had also developed their own corporate offset policies, while 
industry and professional organisations produced new best practice guidance (CIRIA et al., 2016). 
As part of continuing development of the natural capital agenda, Defra and Natural England were 
also working towards recalibrating offsetting as net gain. Importantly, revisions to NPPF in 2017 
strengthened the requirement to deliver net gain in planning (DCLG, 2018). Under Gove, this 
provision was strengthened even further, with the long-awaited publication of the 25 Year 
Environment Plan at the start of 2018, which set delivery of net gain nationally through planning 
as a priority (Defra, 2018a). Reframed, offsetting was firmly back on the policy agenda, and in 
December two new consultations proposing an updated metric and new net gain framework 
were released, which concluded in February 2019 (Defra, 2018c; Natural England, 2018). In 
March, the government announced the policy would be rolled out as part of new Environment 
Bill to be put before Parliament (Defra, 2019). 
In one sense, net gain has emerged as a symbolic repackaging of the scheme aborted in 2014. 
Yet the new proposals addressed numerous stakeholder criticisms of the original proposals. The 
most important shift is the insistence that net gain of biodiversity, set at a standard percentage 
using the refined metric, will be a compulsory condition of planning consent for all forms of land 
development (Defra, 2018c). The revisions appear to have won over the most powerful 
environmental NGOs and professional ecologist networks (e.g. CIEEM, 2019; TWT, 2018). In 
terms of benefits for business, policymakers removed the promise of cost neutrality, but claimed 
that costs to developers would effectively be negligible, with 90 percent of the estimated £64 
million per year absorbed in windfall profits landowners accrue when planning consent is granted 
(Defra, 2018b). In addition, Defra argues developers overall project costs are likely to shrink, as 
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a considerably simplified and standardised process of compliance is expected to significantly 
reduce delays, disputes and other uncertain transaction costs. This includes an option of paying 
of a standard tariff linked to onsite biodiversity impact, to invest in independently operated 
habitat banks if no suitable compensation site can be found by local actors. In terms of 
addressing regulatory capacity in LPAs, the proposals suggest oversight and enforcement will be 
more straightforward with a highly standardised system combined with best practice guidance 
and greater involvement of non-state actors, while random sampling and increased use of 
remote sensing technologies should reduce the need for costly onsite monitoring. Whether 
Defra and its agencies truly have the capacity to oversee such a scheme however, remains an 
open question (see e.g. Harvey, 2019). 
Overall however, the new framework represents a significant reconfiguration of Defras 2013 
green paper. Building on other policy developments, it looks to extend the states authoritative 
alongside economic power to build regulatory markets in nature. This is reflected in a decisive 
shift in tone in favour of environmental outcomes (as well as local community benefit), and a 
retreat from the previously strong rhetoric of market rationality, towards one of technocratic 
administration. Appeals to environmental groups, developers and regulators, for instance, are 
primarily made on the basis of standardised and streamlined processes, rather than market 
efficient outcomes. At the time of writing though (April 2019), the wider conditions for 
offsettings realisation in England remain extremely unstable. Having repeatedly failing to pass 
its EU withdrawal agreement through the UK parliament before the original, legal deadline, the 
Conservative government is on the brink of collapse amid an unprecedented political and 
constitutional crisis. As a result, the UKs legislature is gridlocked, and May has already 
announced her resignation once the UKs leaves the EU. Defras current programme and political 
influence could be curtailed at any moment, and there is a strong possibility the UK will have a 
new government  and set of priorities  before net gain of biodiversity can be brought into law. 
While the short term future is decidedly uncertain, offsettings longer term fate will no doubt 
depend on the actions of the next government, and how state, environmental, and development 
forces realign. 
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Ecological offsetting and the sharpening tensions of late neoliberal natures 
A growing critical literature on ecological offsetting has exposed social and ecological 
contradictions, and its role in reproducing entrenched power and cases of injustice. This work 
challenges offsettings effectiveness from an ecological perspective and the political interests 
served and marginalised by its application. However, few critical studies have theorised how and 
why offsetting policies have successfully taken hold in some contexts, but not others. This seems 
an increasingly important task, in a historical moment when offsetting seems ubiquitous in 
conservation debates at the same time as it institutionally stumbles in different contexts. The 
two case studies compared above demonstrate the usefulness of a command-and-commodify 
framework in addressing this gap. In specifying these types of regulatory environmental markets 
as dependent on a delicate balance of authoritative and economic power, it was possible to 
examine how differently constituted historical and institutional settings enabled Californian 
species banking to flourish, while efforts to set up biodiversity offsetting in England have yet to 
be realised.  
The particular historical junctures in the Californian and English cases suggest broader lessons 
about when and where new markets in nature may emerge, and when and where they may not.  
In California, the environmental backlash of the 1980s and the economic slowdown following the 
savings and loan crisis set the stage for the governors moves to stimulate land development by 
streamlining environmental regulation. However, the relative power and resources available to 
environmental advocates and regulators provided a basis for considerable ecological 
reregulation of land, enabling a certain institutional compromise between development and 
conservation interests. This resulted in a partially redirected rollout of neoliberal policy where a 
market mechanism  rhetorically at least  played a substantive role in depoliticising competing 
economic and environmental demands and, arguably, generating marginal gains in protections 
for endangered species themselves.  
When the UK government announced an offsetting programme with similar aspirations, it did so 
under different historical conditions. Decades of attacks on the planning system and 
environmental laws combined with chronic underinvestment in regulatory agencies had steadily 
eroded the material value of biodiversity in planning. Part of the response from the incoming 
coalition government to the post-2008 crisis was to instigate yet another attack on 
environmental protection and planning for holding back the recovery, alongside a programme of 
 27 
deep fiscal austerity. Whereas in California environmental and regulatory forces were able to 
shape efforts to streamline environmental protection, institutionalising a similar balancing act in 
England has proven difficult. While species banking emerged as something of a practical and 
depoliticising solution to competing demands in California, in England the creation of a 
biodiversity offsetting market in its first iteration was constructed in far more utopian and 
ideological terms  at a time when the legitimacy of the free market was seriously damaged and 
when conservatives were objecting to nearly any environmental regulatory expansions. Instead 
of neutralising conflicts between development and conservation, offsetting politicised them 
further. As a result, the latest proposals signal a technocratic turn, with rhetorical emphasis on 
procedural improvements and standardisation rather than market forces, and with substantive 
focus on expanding the states authoritative control over land development. 
Overall, we argue that the failure to establish a biodiversity offsetting system in England, 20 years 
after species banking took off in California, suggests that the successful rollout of new 
environmental markets is increasingly unlikely in conditions akin to the English case, where 
(neo)liberalisation has so profoundly shaped institutional context and regulatory capacity. 
Ironically, it appears that rhetorical commitments to free market solutions to social and 
ecological problems progressively undermined conditions for the constitution of regulatory 
command-and-commodify markets, ceding yet more ground to deregulatory forces. The 
original unspoken pact of offsetting, which allowed developers flexibility over how to comply 
with environmental law, while taking more land, as long as regulators could simultaneously 
expand their power, broke down. The same may be true in similar institutional settings, including 
in the United States, where staunch conservative opposition to regulatory expansion has stymied 
efforts to implement a nationwide, market-oriented cap-and-trade system for regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
In the context of austerity and neoliberal restructuring, which has seen the ascendency of 
development and industrial interests in relation to ecological regulation, governments like those 
in the UK may find it increasingly hard to create new environmental markets. On the other hand, 
natures neoliberalisation has always unfolded unevenly. In situations where the balance of 
authoritative and economic power still more closely resembles the conditions we observe in 
California in the 1990s, the project of environmental market-making may still be gaining steam. 
In places where the economic crisis has been more contained, and where governments remain 
 28 
capable of expanding their authoritative control and face public pressure to address 
environmental issues, we expect that new forms of neoliberal nature and novel markets in 
environmental goods may continue to grow. Chinas recent embrace of cap-and-trade and the 
increasingly marketised character of ecological offsetting in Germany are clear examples. Even 
in England, recent recalibrations of political power and the resilience of pro-environment 
factions may yet facilitate the emergence of command-and-commodify regulation. Such 
dynamics have wider implications, given the expansion of environmental markets forms a core 
component of the neoliberalisation of nature. Are conditions conducive to this kind of 
environmental policymaking evermore elusive, undermined by the very politics that initially 
drove them forward? Or is there life left in the project of neoliberalising nature? The answer, we 
suggest, depends upon context, and how ecologically-focused authoritative and economic power 
are crystalised in different historical and geographical moments. Even Brexit may have rather 
unexpectedly created the conditions  perhaps fleetingly  for offsetting to be revived in the UK.  
In 2012, James McCarthy (2012) highlighted the renewed urgency of debates around the 
relationship between neoliberalism and environmental governance in the United States, 
suggesting an increasingly antagonistic recalibration of nature-society relations looked likely. As 
Bigger and Dempsey (2018) point out, this tension has, if anything, become more pronounced. 
Their own review of the literature is bookended by the global financial crisis and election of 
Donald Trump. This shift to the nationalist and authoritarian right is in no way unique, taking 
various forms in places as diverse as India, Italy, Hungary, the Philippines, Russia, Turkey, the UK 
and Brazil. While green concerns have rarely been front and centre in this moving political 
landscape, hostility to environmental issues and multilateralism is a common thread. 
Interrogating the evacuation of the political centre-ground  to the left as well as right  is an 
important task for scholars of neoliberal natures today. 
The wider premise of the neoliberalisation of nature was always that neoliberalism itself was 
something of a historical compromise  part constituted by emerging environmental limits, at 
once biophysical and political, which needed to be tamed in the service of continued 
accumulation (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004; Nelson, 2015). Where the balance of power looks 
more like California in the 1990s than England in the 2010s, bargains like these may continue to 
be struck. Moreover, in terms of ecological offsetting and environmental markets, those already 
established appear to remain resilient, supported by the interest groups they have helped create 
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(e.g. capitalists who profit from them; states that derive revenue from them). Carbon finance 
may not have boomed, but markets in ecological offsets continue to steadily grow. 157 new for-
profit ecological offsetting banks were approved in the United States in 2017, more than in any 
other previous year. Cap-and-trade schemes proliferate around the globe. Our analysis points to 
the importance of understanding development  arrested or not  of these markets in nature by 
looking at the institutions and conditions that enable them. It is in these specific contexts, after 
all, where the various compromises and fixes that comprise neoliberal natures have to be 
enacted, held together, and operationalised. As a final point, we caution against premature 
celebrations of the difficulties faced by neoliberal policies like biodiversity offsetting in England. 
While we may agree environmental markets have always been a false solution to the seriousness 
of our socio-ecological predicament, their failure in these circumstances may prove no less 
deleterious to our efforts to navigate the converging crises of the present.  
References 
Aldersgate Group (2013) Consultation response: Biodiversity Offsetting in England. Available at: 
http://www.aldersgategroup.org.uk/asset/download/236/1311%20AG%20biodiversity
%20offset%20consultation%20response.pdf (accessed 4 March 2014). 
Apostolopoulou E and Adams WM (2017) Biodiversity offsetting and conservation: reframing 
nature to save it. Oryx 51(1): 2331. DOI: 10.1017/S0030605315000782. 
Asiyanbi AP (2018) Scale and the accomplishments of the neoliberalization of the nature. 
Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space 1(12): 4448. DOI: 
10.1177/2514848618776864. 
Bakker K (2010) The limits of neoliberal natures: Debating green neoliberalism. Progress in 
Human Geography 34(6): 715735. DOI: 10.1177/0309132510376849. 
Bartley T (2007) Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational 
Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions1. American Journal of 
Sociology 113(2): 297351. 
Bayon R (2004) Making Environmental Markets Work: Lessons from early experience with 
sulphur, carbon, wetlands, and other related markets. Forest Trends. Available at: 
http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_121.pdf (accessed 25 January 
2016). 
Bayon R and Jenkins M (2010) The business of biodiversity. Nature 466(7303): 184185. DOI: 
10.1038/466184a. 
 30 
BBOP (2013) To No Net Loss and Beyond An Overview of the Business and   Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme (BBOP). Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme. Available at: 
http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3319.pdf. 
Benabou S (2014) Making Up for Lost Nature? A Critical Review of the International Development 
of Voluntary Biodiversity Offsets. Environment and Society: Advances in Research 5(1): 
103123. DOI: 10.3167/ares.2014.050107. 
Bigger P and Dempsey J (2018) The ins and outs of neoliberal natures. Environment and Planning 
E: Nature and Space 1(12): 2543. DOI: 10.1177/2514848618776864. 
BIS (2013) Better Regulation Framework Manual: Practical Guidance for UK Government 
Officials. Department of Business, Innovation and Skills. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/Department-for-business-innovation-
skills (accessed 11 November 2014). 
Boisvert V, Méral P and Froger G (2013) Market-Based Instruments for Ecosystem Services: 
Institutional Innovation or Renovation? Society & Natural Resources 26(10): 11221136. 
DOI: 10.1080/08941920.2013.820815. 
Bonneuil C (2015) Tell me where you come from, I will tell you who you are: A genealogy of 
biodiversity offsetting mechanisms in historical context. Biological Conservation 192: 
485491. DOI: 10.1016/j.biocon.2015.09.022. 
Brenner N, Peck J and Theodore N (2010) Variegated neoliberalization: geographies, modalities, 
pathways. Global Networks 10(2): 182222. DOI: 10.1111/j.1471-0374.2009.00277.x. 
Bull JW, Suttle KB, Gordon A, et al. (2013) Biodiversity offsets in theory and practice. Oryx 47(03): 
369380. DOI: 10.1017/S003060531200172X. 
Büscher B, Sullivan S, Neves K, et al. (2012) Towards a Synthesized Critique of Neoliberal 
Biodiversity Conservation. Capitalism Nature Socialism 23(2): 430. DOI: 
10.1080/10455752.2012.674149. 
Büscher B, Dressler W and Fletcher R (2014) Nature Inc.: Environmental Conservation in the 
Neoliberal Age. University of Arizona Press. 
Calvet C, Napoléone C and Salles J-M (2015) The Biodiversity Offsetting Dilemma: Between 
Economic Rationales and Ecological Dynamics. Sustainability 7(6): 73577378. DOI: 
10.3390/su7067357. 
Cameron D (2010) Transforming the British economy: Coalition strategy for economic growth. 
Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/transforming-the-british-
economy-coalition-strategy-for-economic-growth (accessed 5 November 2016). 
Campbell JL and Lindberg LN (1990) Property Rights and the Organization of Economic Activity 
by the State. American Sociological Review 55(5): 634647. 
 31 
Carreras Gamarra MJ and Toombs TP (2017) Thirty years of species conservation banking in the 
U.S.: Comparing policy to practice. Biological Conservation 214: 612. DOI: 
10.1016/j.biocon.2017.07.021. 
Carrington D (2012) Owen Paterson: true blue countryman putting wind up green campaigners. 
The Guardian, 11 October. Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/oct/11/owen-paterson-environment-
guardian-profile (accessed 7 May 2013). 
Carrington D (2013) Row over £1bn development plan on nightingale habitat site in Kent. The 
Guardian, 29 March. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/mar/29/nightingales-lodge-hill-mod-
site (accessed 10 July 2018). 
Carroll N, Fox J and Bayon R (eds) (2009) Conservation and Biodiversity Banking: A Guide to 
Setting Up and Running Biodiversity Credit Trading Systems. Routledge. 
Carton W (2014) Environmental Protection as Market Pathology?: Carbon Trading and the 
Dialectics of the Double Movement. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 
32(6): 10021018. DOI: 10.1068/d13038p. 
Castree N (2008a) Neoliberalising nature: processes, effects, and evaluations. Environment and 
Planning A 40(1): 153  173. DOI: 10.1068/a39100. 
Castree N (2008b) Neoliberalising nature: the logics of deregulation and reregulation. 
Environment and Planning A 40(1): 131  152. DOI: 10.1068/a3999. 
CEP and IEEP (2013) Evaluation of the Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot Phase - Indicative Costs of 
Current Compensation Arrangements for Biodiversity Loss: Illustrative Case Studies 
(Report on Task 4). WC 1051, November. London: Collingwood Environmental Planning 
Ltd. Available at: 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=12534_WC1051Task4ReportFIN
AL.PDF (accessed 22 February 2016). 
CEP and IEEP (2014a) Evaluation of the Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot Programme: Final Report 
Volume 1. WC 1051, June. London: Collingwood Environmental Planning Ltd. Available 
at: 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=12535_WC1051_Volume_1_Fin
al_Report.pdf (accessed 22 February 2016). 
CEP and IEEP (2014b) Evaluation of the Biodiversity Offsetting Pilot Programme Volume 2 
(Annex): Pilot Reports. WC 1051, June. London: Collingwood Environmental Planning Ltd. 
Available at: 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=12536_Volume_2_(Annex)_Pilo
t_Reports.pdf (accessed 22 February 2016). 
CIEEM (2013) Consultation Response: Biodiversity Offsetting in England Green Paper (Defra). 
Chartered Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management. Available at: 
 32 
http://www.cieem.net/data/files/Resource_Library/Policy/Consultation_Responses/CI
EEM_offsetting_response_FINAL.pdf. 
CIEEM (2019) Consultation Response Document: Biodiversity Net Gain (Defra). Chartered 
Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management. Available at: 
https://cieem.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CIEEM-Net-Gain-consultation-
response-Feb2019-FINAL.pdf. 
CIRIA, CIEEM and IEMA (2016) Biodiversity Net Gain: Good practice principles for development. 
Available at: 
https://www.cieem.net/data/files/Publications/Biodiversity_Net_Gain_Principles.pdf. 
CLA (2013) Country Land and Business Association (CLA) response to Biodiversity Offsetting in 
England Consultation. Country Land and Business Association. 
Clare S and Krogman N (2013) Bureaucratic Slippage and Environmental Offset Policies: The Case 
of Wetland Management in Alberta. Society & Natural Resources 26(6): 672687. DOI: 
10.1080/08941920.2013.779341. 
Colenutt R, Cochrane A and Field M (2015) The rise and rise of viability assessment. Town and 
Country Planning 84: 453458. 
Cook BJ (1988) Bureaucratic Politics and Regulatory Reform: The Epa and Emissions Trading. 
Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated. 
Cowell R (2013) The Greenest Government Ever? Planning and Sustainability in England after the 
May 2010 Elections. Planning Practice and Research 28(1): 2744. DOI: 
10.1080/02697459.2012.694299. 
Cox M (2016) The pathology of command and control: a formal synthesis. Ecology and Society 
21(3). DOI: 10.5751/ES-08698-210333. 
CPRE (2015) Set up to fail: why housing targets based on flawed numbers threaten our 
countryside. Campaign for the Protection of Rural England. Available at: 
https://www.cpre.org.uk/resources/housing-and-
planning/housing/item/download/4307 (accessed 14 June 2018). 
Daily G (ed.) (1997) Natures Services: Societal Dependence On Natural Ecosystems. 1st ed. Island 
Press. 
David Tyldesley and Associates (2012) Planning Policy and Biodiversity Offsets: Report on Phase 
II research - Effectiveness of the application of current planning policy in the town and 
country planning system. 1791, Report to DEFRA, March. Nottingham: David Tyldesley 
and Associates. Available at: 
http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=10054_PhaseIIFINALREPORTPDF
.pdf (accessed 1 December 2013). 
DCLG (2012) National Planning Policy Framework. Technical guidance, March. London: HMSO. 
Available at: 
 33 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6077
/2116950.pdf (accessed 7 May 2013). 
DCLG (2018) National Planning Policy Framework. July. London: HMSO. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/740441/National_Planning_Policy_Framework_web_accessible_versio
n.pdf. 
de Groot RS, Wilson MA and Boumans RMJ (2002) A Typology for the Classification, Description 
and Valuation of Ecosystem Functions, Goods and Services. Ecological Economics 41(3): 
393408. 
Defra (2011) The Natural Environment White Paper: The Natural Choice - Securing the Value of 
Nature. CM 8082, Government White Paper, June. London: HMSO. 
Defra (2012a) Biodiversity Offsetting Pilots: Information note for Local Authorities. PB13744, 
March. London: DEFRA. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6952
9/pb13744-bio-local-authority-info-note.pdf (accessed 9 May 2013). 
Defra (2012b) Biodiversity Offsetting Pilots: Technical Paper - the metric for the biodiversity 
offsetting pilot in England. PB13745, March. London: DEFRA. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6953
1/pb13745-bio-technical-paper.pdf (accessed 9 May 2013). 
Defra (2013) Biodiversity offsetting in England: Green Paper. September. London: DEFRA. 
Defra (2016) Consultation on biodiversity offsetting in England: Summary of responses. February. 
London: DEFRA. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/5012
40/biodiversity-offsetting-consult-sum-resp.pdf (accessed 22 February 2016). 
Defra (2018a) A Green Future: Our 25 Year Plan to Improve the Environment. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/693158/25-year-environment-plan.pdf. 
Defra (2018b) Biodiversity Net Gain Impact Assessment. December. London: Defra. Available at: 
https://consult.defra.gov.uk/land-use/net-
gain/supporting_documents/181121%20%20Biodiversity%20Net%20Gain%20Consulta
tion%20IA%20FINAL%20for%20publication.pdf. 
Defra (2018c) Net gain: Consultation proposals. DEFRA. Available at: 
https://consult.defra.gov.uk/land-use/net-
gain/supporting_documents/netgainconsultationdocument.pdf. 
Defra (2019) Government to mandate biodiversity net gain. In: Defra in the Media. Available at: 
https://deframedia.blog.gov.uk/2019/03/13/government-to-mandate-biodiversity-net-
gain/ (accessed 5 April 2019). 
 34 
Dempsey J and Collard R-C (2017) If biodiversity offsets are a dead end for conservation, what is 
the live wire? A response to Apostolopoulou & Adams. Oryx 51(1): 3539. DOI: 
10.1017/S0030605316000752. 
Dempsey J and Robertson MM (2012) Ecosystem services Tensions, impurities, and points of 
engagement within neoliberalism. Progress in Human Geography 36(6): 758779. DOI: 
10.1177/0309132512437076. 
Dempsey J and Suarez DC (2016) Arrested Development? The Promises and Paradoxes of Selling 
Nature to Save It. Annals of the American Association of Geographers 106(3): 653671. 
DOI: 10.1080/24694452.2016.1140018. 
Dobbin F and Dowd TJ (2000) The Market That Antitrust Built: Public Policy, Private Coercion, 
and Railroad Acquisitions, 1825 to 1922. American Sociological Review 65(5): 631657. 
DOI: 10.2307/2657540. 
Dressler W and Roth R (2011) The Good, the Bad, and the Contradictory: Neoliberal Conservation 
Governance in Rural Southeast Asia. World Development 39(5): 851862. DOI: 
10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.08.016. 
EAC (2013) Biodiversity Offsetting: Sixth Report of Session 2013-14. HC 750, Public Inquiry, 12 
November. London: HMSO. Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmenvaud/750/750.p
df (accessed 12 November 2013). 
EFRA Committee (2012) Natural Environment White Paper: Fourth Report of Session 2012-13, 
Volume II. HC 492, Public Inquiry, 17 July. London: HMSO. Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmenvfru/492/492vw.
pdf (accessed 15 May 2013). 
eftec et al. (2010) The use of market-based instruments for biodiversity protection  The case of 
habitat banking  Technical Report. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/pdf/eftec_habitat_technical_report.pdf 
(accessed 25 January 2016). 
EMTF (2013) Realising natures value: The Final Report of the Ecosystem Markets Task Force. 
PB13895, March. London: Ecosystem Markets Task Force. Available at: 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/ecosystem-markets/files/Ecosystem-Markets-Task-Force-
Final-Report-.pdf (accessed 12 April 2013). 
ENDS Report (2011) DEFRA warned over voluntary offset approach. The ENDS Report, February. 
Environment Bank (2013) Environment Bank response to Defra consultation on Green Paper on 
biodiversity offsetting. Available at: http://www.environmentbank.com/files/eb-defra-
gp-response-final.pdf (accessed 6 March 2014). 
Environment Bank (2016) Newsletter  Spring 2016. Available at: 
http://www.environmentbank.com/files/eb-newsletter-spring-2016.pdf. 
 35 
Environmental Law Institute (1994) National Wetland Mitigation Banking Study: Wetland 
Migitation Banking. IWR Report 94-WMB-6. 
Farley J and Costanza R (2010) Payments for Ecosystem Services: From local to global. Ecological 
Economics. 
Feldman TD and Jonas AEG (2000) Sage Scrub Revolution? Property Rights, Political 
Fragmentation, and Conservation Planning in Southern California under the Federal 
Endangered Species Act. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90(2): 256
292. DOI: 10.1111/0004-5608.00195. 
Felli R (2015) Environment, not planning: the neoliberal depoliticisation of environmental policy 
by means of emissions trading. Environmental Politics 24(5): 641660. DOI: 
10.1080/09644016.2015.1051323. 
Fletcher R (2010) Neoliberal environmentality: towards a poststructuralist political ecology of 
the conservation debate. Conservation and Society 8(3): 171181. 
Fligstein N (2001) The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First-Century 
Capitalist Societies. Princeton University Press. 
Fourcade M and Healy K (2007) Moral Views of Market Society. Annual Review of Sociology 33(1): 
285311. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131642. 
Fourcade-Gourinchas M and Babb SL (2002) The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to 
Neoliberalism in Four Countries1. American Journal of Sociology 108(3): 533579. 
Gamble A (2015) Austerity as Statecraft. Parliamentary Affairs 68(1): 4257. DOI: 
10.1093/pa/gsu016. 
Gardner RC (2011) Lawyers, Swamps, and Money: U.S. Wetland Law, Policy, and Politics. Island 
Press. 
Gardner TA, Von Hase A, Brownlie S, et al. (2013) Biodiversity Offsets and the Challenge of 
Achieving No Net Loss. Conservation Biology 27(6): 12541264. DOI: 
10.1111/cobi.12118. 
Gareau BJ (2013) From Precaution to Profit: Contemporary Challenges to Environmental 
Protection in the Montreal Protocol. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
Gómez-Baggethun E and Muradian R (2015) In markets we trust? Setting the boundaries of 
Market-Based Instruments in ecosystem services governance. Ecological Economics 117: 
217224. DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.03.016. 
Gordon A, Bull JW, Wilcox C, et al. (2015) FORUM: Perverse incentives risk undermining 
biodiversity offset policies. Journal of Applied Ecology 52(2): 532537. DOI: 
10.1111/1365-2664.12398. 
Granovetter M (2017) Society and Economy: Framework and Principles. Harvard University Press. 
 36 
Guthman J (2007) The Polanyian way? Voluntary food labels as neoliberal governance. Antipode 
39(3): 456478. 
Harvey D (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. 1st, First Edition ed. Oxford University Press, 
USA. 
Harvey F (2011) Autumn statement: George Osborne slams costly green policies. The Guardian, 
29 November. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/nov/29/autumn-
statement-george-osborne-green-policies (accessed 19 July 2016). 
Harvey F (2019) Agency protecting English environment reaches crisis point. The Guardian, 29 
January. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jan/29/agency-protecting-english-
environment-reaches-crisis-point (accessed 30 January 2019). 
Hase A von and ten Kate K (2017) Correct framing of biodiversity offsets and conservation: a 
response to Apostolopoulou & Adams. Oryx 51(1): 3234. DOI: 
10.1017/S0030605316001022. 
Haughton G and Allmendinger P (2013) Spatial Planning and the New Localism. Planning Practice 
& Research 28(1): 15. DOI: 10.1080/02697459.2012.699706. 
Haughton G and Allmendinger P (2016) Think tanks and the pressures for planning reform in 
England. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy: 0263774X16629677. DOI: 
10.1177/0263774X16629677. 
HBF (2013) HBF response to DEFRAs consultation on Biodiversity Offsetting in England. Home 
Builders Federation. 
Holmes G and Cavanagh CJ (2016) A review of the social impacts of neoliberal conservation: 
Formations, inequalities, contestations. Geoforum 75: 199209. DOI: 
10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.07.014. 
Hough P and Robertson M (2009) Mitigation under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: where it 
comes from, what it means. Wetlands Ecology and Management 17(1): 1533. DOI: 
10.1007/s11273-008-9093-7. 
Hrabanski M (2015) The biodiversity offsets as market-based instruments in global governance: 
Origins, success and controversies. Ecosystem Services 15: 143151. DOI: 
10.1016/j.ecoser.2014.12.010. 
Hubner J (2009) Ecological Modernization: Beyond Scarcity and Bureaucracy. In: The Ecological 
Modernisation Reader: Environmental Reform in Theory and Practice Modernisation 
Reader. Routledge. 
Ioris AAR (2014) The Political Ecology of the State: The Basis and the Evolution of Environmental 
Statehood ?>ŽŶĚŽŶථ ?EĞǁzŽƌŬ ?ZŽƵƚůĞĚŐĞ ? 
 37 
Jenkins M, Scherr SJ and Inbar M (2004) Markets for biodiversity services: potential roles and 
challenges. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 46(6): 3242. 
Kaminski I (2014) Controversial Deregulation Bill laid before parliament. Available at: 
http://www.endsreport.com/42919/controversial-deregulation-bill-laid-before-
parliament (accessed 21 February 2015). 
Kaminski I (2015) The green tape challenge. Available at: 
http://www.endsreport.com/article/47289/the-green-tape-challenge (accessed 16 July 
2016). 
Kaminski I (2017) Brexit could speed up environmental deregulation. Available at: 
https://www.endsreport.com/56170/brexit-could-speed-up-environmental-
deregulation (accessed 1 February 2019). 
Kay K (2016) Breaking the bundle of rights: Conservation easements and the legal geographies 
of individuating nature. Environment and Planning A 48(3): 504522. DOI: 
10.1177/0308518X15609318. 
Kay K (2018) A Hostile Takeover of Nature? Placing Value in Conservation Finance. Antipode 
50(1): 164183. DOI: 10.1111/anti.12335. 
Kiesecker JM, Copeland H, Pocewicz A, et al. (2009) Development by design: blending landscape-
level planning with the mitigation hierarchy. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 
8(5): 261266. DOI: 10.1890/090005. 
Lave R (2012) Fields and Streams: Stream Restoration, Neoliberalism, and the Future of 
Environmental Science. University of Georgia Press. 
Lave R (2014) Neoliberal Confluences: The Turbulent Evolution of Stream Mitigation Banking in 
the US. In: Frickel S and Hess DJ (eds) Fields of Knowledge: Science, Politics and Publics in 
the Neoliberal Age. Political Power and Social Theory 27. Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited, pp. 5988. Available at: 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/S0198-871920140000027010 
(accessed 11 January 2016). 
Lave R (2018) Not so neo. Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space 1(12): 5457. DOI: 
10.1177/2514848618776864. 
Lawton J, Brotherton P, Brown V, et al. (2010) Making Space for Nature: a review of Englands 
wildlife sites and ecological network. Report to DEFRA, 16 September. Available at: 
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/biodiversity/documents/201009space-for-
nature.pdf (accessed 8 May 2013). 
Lawton RN and Rudd MA (2013) Strange Bedfellows: Ecosystem Services, Conservation Science, 
and Central Government in the United Kingdom. Resources 2(2): 114127. DOI: 
10.3390/resources2020114. 
 38 
Layzer JA (2012a) Open for Business: Conservatives Opposition to Environmental Regulation. MIT 
Press. 
Layzer JA (2012b) Open for Business: Conservatives Opposition to Environmental Regulation. MIT 
Press. 
Lederer M (2012) Market making via regulation: The role of the state in carbon markets. 
Regulation & Governance 6(4): 524544. DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-5991.2012.01145.x. 
Liverman D (2004) Who governs, at what scale and at what price? Geography, environmental 
governance, and the commodification of nature. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 94(4): 734738. 
Locke RM (2013) The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a Global 
Economy. Cambridge University Press. 
Lockhart A (2015) Developing an offsetting programme: tensions, dilemmas and difficulties in 
biodiversity market-making in England. Environmental Conservation 42(04): 335344. 
DOI: 10.1017/S0376892915000193. 
Lockhart A (2016) Unnatural Markets: The politics of biodiversity offsetting and failed 
environmental market-making in England. PhD Thesis. University of Sheffield. 
Lockie S and Higgins V (2007) Roll-out neoliberalism and hybrid practices of regulation in 
Australian agri-environmental governance. Journal of Rural Studies 23(1): 111. DOI: 
10.1016/j.jrurstud.2006.09.011. 
Lockwood M and Davidson J (2010) Environmental governance and the hybrid regime of 
Australian natural resource management. Geoforum 41(3): 388398. DOI: 
10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.12.001. 
Lord A and Tewdwr-Jones M (2014) Is Planning Under Attack? Chronicling the Deregulation of 
Urban and Environmental Planning in England. European Planning Studies 22(2): 345
361. DOI: 10.1080/09654313.2012.741574. 
Madsen B, Carroll N, Kandy D, et al. (2011) 2011 Update: State of Biodiversity Markets. 
Washington, DC: Forest Trends. Available at: http://www. 
ecosystemmarketplace.com/reports/2011_update_sbdm (accessed 7 January 2014). 
Mann M (2013) The Sources of Social Power: Volume 4, Globalizations, 1945-2011. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Maron M, Ives CD, Kujala H, et al. (2016) Taming a Wicked Problem: Resolving Controversies in 
Biodiversity Offsetting. BioScience: biw038. DOI: 10.1093/biosci/biw038. 
Mathiesen K (2013) Is biodiversity offsetting a license to trash nature? The Guardian, 12 
November. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/12/biodiversity-offsetting-
license-trash-nature (accessed 1 June 2015). 
 39 
McAfee K (1999) Selling Nature to Save It? Biodiversity and the Rise of Green Developmentalism. 
Environment and Planning 17: 133154. 
McAfee K and Shapiro EN (2010) Payments for Ecosystem Services in Mexico: Nature, 
Neoliberalism, Social Movements, and the State. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 100(3): 579599. DOI: 10.1080/00045601003794833. 
McCarthy J (2005) Devolution in the Woods: Community Forestry as Hybrid Neoliberalism. 
Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 37(6): 9951014. DOI: 
10.1068/a36266. 
McCarthy J (2012) The financial crisis and environmental governance afterneoliberalism. 
Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie 103(2): 180195. 
McCarthy J and Prudham S (2004) Neoliberal Nature and the Nature of Neoliberalism. Geoforum 
35(3): 275283. 
McElwee PD (2012) Payments for environmental services as neoliberal market-based forest 
conservation in Vietnam: Panacea or problem? Geoforum 43(3). The Global Rise and 
Local Implications of Market-Oriented Conservation Governance: 412426. DOI: 
10.1016/j.geoforum.2011.04.010. 
MEA (2005) Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis Report. Washington, DC: Island Press. 
Moreno-Mateos D, Maris V, Béchet A, et al. (2015) The true loss caused by biodiversity offsets. 
Biological Conservation 192: 552559. DOI: 10.1016/j.biocon.2015.08.016. 
Mulligan SP (2016) Evolution of the Meaning of Waters of the United States in the Clean Water 
Act. Congressional Research Service. 
Myers N, Mittermeier RA, Mittermeier CG, et al. (2000) Biodiversity hotspots for conservation 
priorities. Nature 403(6772): 853858. 
National Research Council (2001) Compensating for Wetland Losses Under the Clean Water Act. 
National Academies Press. 
Natural England (2018) Updating the Defra Biodiversity Metric. Available at: 
http://publications.naturalengland.org.uk/file/6016536200609792. 
Nelson SH (2015) Beyond The Limits to Growth: Ecology and the Neoliberal Counterrevolution. 
Antipode 47(2): 461480. DOI: 10.1111/anti.12125. 
Newey G (2012) Nurturing Nature: Policy to Protect and Improve Biodiversity. Less S (ed.). 
London: Policy Exchange. 
OECD (2013) Scaling-up Finance Mechanisms for Biodiversity. Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. Available at: http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/content/book/9789264193833-en (accessed 21 August 2015). 
 40 
Oxford M (2013) Ecological Capacity and Competence in Local Planning Authorities: What is 
needed to deliver statutory obligations for biodiversity? Report published by the 
Association of Local Government Ecologists, November. 
Parker G (2017) Developers set for Brexit triumph over great crested newt. Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/83cf8ff0-eef0-11e6-ba01-119a44939bb6 (accessed 1 
February 2019). 
Paterson O (2013) Speech to Policy Exchange. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/owen-paterson-speech-to-policy-
exchange. 
Pawliczek J and Sullivan S (2011) Conservation and concealment in SpeciesBanking.com, USA: an 
analysis of neoliberal performance in the species offsetting industry. Environmental 
Conservation 38(04): 435444. DOI: 10.1017/S0376892911000518. 
Pittman C and Waite M (2009) Paving Paradise: Floridas Vanishing Wetlands and the Failure of 
No Net Loss. First Edition edition. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 
Polanyi K (2001) The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. 
Beacon Press. 
Prasad M (2006) The Politics of Free Markets: The Rise of Neoliberal Economic Policies in Britain, 
France, Germany, and the United States. University of Chicago Press. 
Rea CM (2017) Theorizing command-and-commodify regulation: the case of species 
conservation banking in the United States. Theory and Society 46(1): 2156. DOI: 
10.1007/s11186-017-9283-5. 
Rea CM (2018) Regulatory thickening and the politics of market-oriented environmental policy. 
Working Paper Under Review. 
Robertson M (2006) The nature that capital can see: science, state, and market in the 
commodification of ecosystem services. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 
24(3): 367387. DOI: 10.1068/d3304. 
Robertson MM (2004) The Neoliberalization of Ecosystem Services: Wetland Mitigation Banking 
and Problems in Environmental Governance. Geoforum 35(3): 361373. 
Roy WG (1997) Socializing Capital. Cambridge Univ Press. Available at: 
http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=8335487 
(accessed 19 August 2013). 
RSPB (2013) Consultation on the Green Paper on Biodiversity Offsetting. Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds. Available at: https://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/biodiversity-
offsetting_tcm9-358604.pdf (accessed 28 January 2014). 
 41 
Scott-Campbell R (2016) Biodiversity offsetting  a way forward for a Lawton Levy? In: BSG 
Ecology. Available at: http://www.bsg-ecology.com/biodiversity-offsetting-a-way-
forward-for-a-lawton-levy/ (accessed 24 November 2016). 
Seagle C (2012) Inverting the impacts: Mining, conservation and sustainability claims near the 
Rio Tinto/QMM ilmenite mine in Southeast Madagascar. The Journal of Peasant Studies 
39(2): 447477. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2012.671769. 
Sinclair D (1997) Self-regulation versus command and control? Beyond false dichotomies. Law & 
Policy 19(4): 529559. 
Solomon BD and Gorman HS (2002) The Origins, Practice, and Limits of Emissions Trading. Journal 
of Policy History 14(3): 293320. 
Sparrow A (2014) I was sacked by David Cameron to appease the green blob, says Paterson. The 
Guardian, 20 July. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jul/20/owen-paterson-sacked-cabinet-
appease-green-lobby (accessed 11 August 2016). 
Spash CL (2015) Bulldozing biodiversity: The economics of offsets and trading-in Nature. 
Biological Conservation 192: 541551. DOI: 10.1016/j.biocon.2015.07.037. 
Sullivan S (2013) After the Green Rush? Biodiversity Offsets, Uranium Power and the Calculus of 
Casualties in Greening Growth. Human Geography 6(1): 80101. 
Sullivan S and Hannis M (2015) Nets and frames, losses and gains: Value struggles in 
engagements with biodiversity offsetting policy in England. Ecosystem Services 15: 162
173. DOI: 10.1016/j.ecoser.2015.01.009. 
Taherzadeh O and Howley P (2017) No net loss of what, for whom?: stakeholder perspectives to 
Biodiversity Offsetting in England. Environment, Development and Sustainability: 124. 
DOI: 10.1007/s10668-017-9967-z. 
Tait M and Inch A (2016) Putting Localism in Place: Conservative Images of the Good Community 
and the Contradictions of Planning Reform in England. Planning Practice & Research 
31(2): 174194. DOI: 10.1080/02697459.2015.1104219. 
TEEB (2010) The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Mainstreaming the Economics of 
Nature: A Synthesis of the Approach, Conclusions and Recommendations of TEEB. 
Geneva: UNEP. 
ten Kate K and Inbar M (2008) Biodiversity Offsets. In: Carroll N, Fox J, and Bayon R (eds) 
Conservation and Biodiversity Banking: A Guide to Setting Up and Running Biodiversity 
Credit Trading Systems. London; Sterling, VA: Earthscan, pp. 189203. 
ten Kate K, Bishop J and Bayon R (2004) Biodiversity Offsets: Views, Experience, and the Business 
Case. London: IUCN, Gland, Switzerland, Cambridge, and Insight Investment. Available 
at: http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/bdoffsets.pdf. 
 42 
TWT (2018) Biodiversity net gain briefing. The Wildlife Trusts. Available at: 
https://www.wildlifetrusts.org/sites/default/files/2019-
02/Net%20gain%20final%20briefing%20for%20Wildlife%20Trusts.pdf. 
UK NEA (2011) UK National Ecosystem Assessment: Synthesis of the Key Findings. June. 
Cambridge: UNEP-WCMC. Available at: http://uknea.unep-
wcmc.org/Resources/tabid/82/Default.aspx. 
Vaissière A-C and Levrel H (2015) Biodiversity offset markets: What are they really? An empirical 
approach to wetland mitigation banking. Ecological Economics 110: 8188. DOI: 
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.01.002. 
Vidal J (2014) Conservationists split over biodiversity offsetting plans. The Guardian, 3 June. 
Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/03/conservationists-split-over-
biodiversity-offsetting-plans (accessed 20 February 2015). 
Vogel D (2005) The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility. 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Walker S, Brower AL, Stephens RTT, et al. (2009) Why bartering biodiversity fails. Conservation 
Letters 2(4): 149157. DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-263X.2009.00061.x. 
Watt N (2012) David Cameron says EU directives and planning laws are throttling recovery. The 
Guardian, February. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/feb/28/david-cameron-economic-
recovery-nerves (accessed 20 February 2015). 
Weber M (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. University of 
California Press. 
 
